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Richard 0. Lempert

This article was delivered, in a slightly fuller form, as
the first annual Mason Ladd Lecture at the University
of Iowa Law School and was printed in 66 Iowa Law
Review 725-739 (1981). Last year, Professor Lempert
spent the fall semester as the first Mason Ladd Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at Iowa. In the winter
semester, he was a visiting fellow at the center for SocioLegal Studies at Wolfson College, Oxford, where he
worked on a book on the sociology of law.
Now back at the Law School, Professor Lempert has
begun a three-year term as editor of the Law & Society
Review. This journal, which is put out by the Law and
Society Association, regularly publishes empirical and
theoretical studies of law and the legal system.

I v. United States. Trammel

would like to talk about the recent case of Trammel
is a simple case. A man,
Otis Trammel, his wife, Elizabeth Ann, and several
others were involved in a conspiracy to import
heroin into the United States. Elizabeth, a courier for
the group, was caught with four ounces of heroin
during a routine customs search in Hawaii. Otis, we
are told by the Tenth Circuit, was one of three men
who "masterminded" the operation.
They say "it takes a thief to catch a thief." One
might add, "it takes a conspirator to convict a conspirator." Often the best-and sometimes the onlyevidence that a person has been active in a conspiracy is testimony from the person he has conspired
with. There are two problems with securing such
testimony. The first is that each conspirator has a

Fifth Amendment right not to give testimony that
might tend to incriminate him-and almost anything
that tends to incriminate a fellow conspirator will
incriminate the speaker as well-and the second is
that totally apart from the danger of self-incrimination there may be a degree of honor among thieves; a
person may simply not want to testify against a partner in crime. Fortunately, the state can overcome
each obstacle, the first by giving use immunity
thereby negating the Fifth Amendment claim and the
second by offering a reward-such as an agreement
not to prosecute-sufficient to overcome any natural
hesitancy to tum on one's fellows.
In Trammel, the prosecutor, whether from delicate
feelings of chivalry, a sense of relative blameworthiness, or a good idea as to who would break first
under pressure, chose not to indict the two women
involved provided they would testify against the
three men. So far, so good; justice is on its way to
being done. However, there was one hitch. Elizabeth
Ann Trammel was Otis Trammel' s wife and under a
rule of law which I call the spousal immunity, Trammel had an apparent right to prevent his wife from
testifying against him.
This rule, or privilege if you will, apparently arose
in the late sixteenth century. Its existence is implied
by a case in Chancery in 1579 and it is mentioned
frequently enough in the early seventeenth century
that one may safely presume a somewhat earlier existence. The rule provides, with certain exceptions not
applicable in Trammel, that one spouse may not testify against the other in a criminal case. Since
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spouses were not barred by this rule from testifying
on behalf of each other the common-law rule meant,
in effect, that one spouse could not testify against
another over the other spouse's objection. It is this
rule that has been transformed, in a way I shall soon
describe, by the Supreme Court's opinion in Trammel
and by the decisions of numerous state courts and
legislatures before that. A related rule, which protects
the confidentiality of private marital communications,
has not been affected by these developments.
Reviewing the history of the spousal immunity,
two features stand out. First, it has almost always
been used to bar the testimony of wives against their
husbands. In view of this, I shall abandon the sex
neutral term "spouse" that I have thus far used and
shall instead refer to testifying or witness spouses as
"wives" and defendant spouses as "husbands."
Second, although the rule may have its origins in
attitudes which we regard today as irrational, such as
the notion that husband and wife are in some sense
one or that for a woman to incriminate her husband
is akin to petty treason, it is also the case that from
the earliest times an important justification for the
rule was what we would today call an argument from
public policy, namely, that to allow one spouse to
testify against another might cause "implacable discord and dissension" and so threaten a marriage.
"Implacable discord and dissension": the phrase
has a nice ring to it. Not only is it sonorous; it is also
sensible. One can easily imagine marriages that
would be destroyed if a wife, forced to testify against
her husband, chose not to perjure herself, but instead
played a crucial part in convincing the jury that her
husband was guilty of a heinous crime. This was
particularly so at the time this rationale arose, for in
the seventeenth century all felonies were in principle
punishable by death.
Nevertheless, there are cases where one wonders
how an honest court could cite this marital harmony
rationale. For example, in one of the few cases where
the rule sealed male lips, dangers of marital discord
and dissension are the court's cited justification for
refusing to receive a man's testimony that his wife
had left him and bigamously married another. One
can only admire a marriage that remained sufficiently
harmonious despite the wife's desertion and remarriage that it was vulnerable to further discord should
the first husband testify against the wife.
Or, conversely, one can only deplore a privilege
which denies the law valuable information on the
pretext of preserving marriages that have long since
been destroyed by the behavior of the spouses. The
privilege becomes even more deplorable if one
believes that the policy justification is itself questionable. Jeremy Bentham, one of the earliest and most
strident critics of the rule, wrote:
It disturbs domestic confidence. Whose? Those
who abuse it to disturb the public security. A miscreant, then, who could be convicted of an
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atrocious crime by the testimony of a woman, has
nothing to fear; if he has only time to go through
the marriage ceremony! No asylum ought to be
open for criminals; every sort of confidence among
them must be destroyed, if possible, even in the
interior of their own houses. If they can neither
find mercenary protectors among the lawyers, nor
concealment at their firesides, what harm is done?
Why, they are compelled to obey the laws, and live
like honest people!
Wigmore, in his classic treatise on evidence, found
an answer to Bentham when he suggested that the
real reason for the spousal immunity was that "there
is a natural repugnance in every fair-minded person to
compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the
other's condemnation .... " However, Wigmore was
not satisfied with his own answer:
This reason, if we reflect upon it, is at least
founded on a fact, and it seems after all to constitute the real and sole strength of the opposition
to abolishing the privilege. Let it be confessed,
then, that this feeling exists, and that it is a natural
one. But does it suffice as a reason for the rule? In
the first place, it is not more than a sentiment ....
In the next place, it exemplifies that general spirit
of sportsmanship which, as elsewhere seen, so
permeates the rules of procedure inherited from
our Anglo-Norman ancestors .... The expedient of
convicting a man out of the mouth of his wife is
(let us say) poor sport, and we shall not stoop
to it. Such is the theory and the sentiment of
sportsmanship
You can be sure that when a law professor attributes a rule to sport and sentiment his next step will
be to urge its abolition for litigation is, quoting again
from Wigmore, "not a game, and ... the law can
never afford to recognize it as such; ... the law,
moreover, does not proceed by sentiment, but aims
at justice." Yet is the wife's stake in the matter only
sentiment? Is there not injustice in forcing the wifepresumably an innocent party-to play the crucial
role in the condemnation of her husband? If she
balks at this and refuses to testify or lies from the
stand is it just that we send her to prison for her
contempt or her crime? Indeed, is our preference for
justice ultimately anything more than a sentiment?
When opposed by otl'ler sentiments, such as those
we have toward family units, love, and the suffering
of innocent people, should justice always prevail?
Let us pause and take stock. We have a rule that
has been with us for almost four centuries and subjected to scathing criticism for much of the last two.
One of its rationales, the unity of husbands and
wives, has been completely discredited and another,
our repugnance at seeing wives testify against husbands, has been dismissed as mere sentiment,
although we may want to dispute this dismissal. The
third, the implications of forced testimony for marital
peace, still stands. The concern is not with the ordi-
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nary marriage where the liability to give testimony
remains inchoate but with the rare marriage where
but for the privilege the testimony would be forced.
In these cases the liability to give testimony might
well be a cause of substantial dissension, and only in
these cases can the abrogation of the immunity lead
to more just results.
In cases where the privilege is invoked we are
trading off the probable destruction of marriages and,
the probable anguish of innocent spouses against
an increased likelihood that justice will be done. For
the moment, we can consider the question of
whether to allow this tradeoff as the basic policy
choice. In balancing the competing interests we
should realize that requiring the wife's testimony will
not necessarily destroy the marriage. But, by the
same token·, abrqgation of the immunity will not necessarily change an unjust result to a just one. If the
wife refuses to testify nothing is gained at trial
although we have whatever dubious satisfaction
comes from seeing a contumacious witness punished.
If the husband is guilty and the wife lies or if the
husband is innocent but the wife testifies truthfully
to incriminatory facts, it is the probability of injustice
that has been enhanced by abrogating the rule. Even
if the husband is guilty and the wife testifies truthfully justice is not necessarily furthered, for the wife's
testimony may have been unnecessary to the conviction or her credibility might have been destroyed
on cross-examination by the revelation of information
that would only be known to an intimate.
Bentham's argument, picked up by Wigmore when
he says it is a curious policy that allows a wrongdoer's interest (in his marriage) to be weighed in
deciding whether he should be allowed to bar testimony against him, neglects the interests of innocent
spouses as well as the interests which children and
others have in keeping families together. We may
have no sympathy for the wrongdoer and no respect
for his interests, but we still might not want to force
the innocent spouse to experience the anguish of
testifying against her husband, nor, for the family's
sake, do we want a marriage that might be intact
upon acquittal, probation, or parole to be destroyed
by the trial process.
But if Wigmore' s arguments are wrong on these
counts, he appears right on another. In applying the
immunity the law never asks whether a particular
marriage is indeed viable. Not only does the law not
ask whether the marriage is worth preserving (a
judgment we would probably not want courts to
make); it also does not ask whether there is any marriage left to preserve. If there isn't, it makes no sense
to deprive a court of evidence.
Surely once a marriage reaches the point where the
wife is willing to testify against her husband there
cannot be much of a marriage left to save. Futhermore, a wife willing to testify against her spouse is
unlikely to suffer anguish at playing a role in his
conviction. Thus, the strongest arguments for this
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marital privilege, the arguments from marital harmony and wifely anguish, have the same Achilles'
Heel. At most they justify a privilege for the witness
spouse. They do not justify allowing a defendant
spouse to keep a witness spouse off the stand. Lawyers and law professors have been making these
arguments for years. In Trammel the nation's highest
court finally listened. Chief Justice Burger, on behalf
of the Court, wrote:
When one spouse is willing to testify against the
other in a criminal proceeding-whatever the
motivation-their relationship is almost certainly
in disrepair; there is probably little in the way
of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve. In
these circumstances, a rule of evidence that permits
an accused to prevent adverse spousal testimony
seems far more likely to frustrate justice than to
foster family peace.
Here it appears we have a happy ending or at least
a rational one, which is the same thing to most legal
scholars. The rule is preserved, reaffirming our judgment about a special quality of marriages and our
reluctance to force a woman to condemn someone
she loves. But where the reason for the rule disappears, the rule does also, and courts are not
deprived of valuable evidence.
I would stop here, except that I don't believe what
I have just said. I don't believe Trammel is correctly
decided, because I don't believe it is wise to vest the
right to claim the privilege solely in the witness
spouse. Let me tell you why.
Years ago I happened to have a conversation about
Earl Warren with a friend who was a clerk at the
Supreme Court when the case of Hawkins v. United
States was decided. In Hawkins as in Trammel the
Court was invited to transfer the right to claim
immunity from the defendant to the witness spouse,
but in Hawkins the invitation was declined. My
friend told me that when he was at the Court, Chief
Justice Warren was in the habit of lunching on Saturdays with clerks from other chambers. One Saturday
discussion turned to Hawkins. For the clerks the case
was simple; the force of the rational argument that I
have outlined for you could not be denied. The Chief
Justice did not find the case so easy. Speaking as a
former prosecutor, he described to the clerks various
ways in which the state can secure apparently voluntary testimony from an unwilling witness. The clerks,
impressed by Warren's knowledge of the real world
and the implicit lesson for those who master only
logic, were even more impressed when it turned out
that Hawkins provided an example of what the Chief
Justice had described. The Court learned, sometime
after this luncheon, that Hawkins' wife had been
imprisoned as a material witness and released only
after giving a three thousand dollar bond conditioned
upon her appearance in court as a witness for the
United States. As Justice Stewart noted in his concurring opinion, "These circumstances are hardly
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consistent with the theory that her testimony was
voluntary." Indeed, one is reminded of the English
courts that warned of the danger of implacable discord and dissension should a person testify against a
bigamous spouse. To call the wife's testimony in
Hawkins voluntary, as the government tried to do, is
just as disingenuous.
As it turns out the testimony in Trammel is also not
voluntary in any pure sense of the word. It is the
product of a plea bargain. To obtain Ms. Trammel's
testimony against her husband the government gave
her immunity for her testimony and advised her that
if she cooperated with the government she might
be charged only with a misdemeanor and receive
probation. Ms. Trammel may have testified willingly
in a certain sense, for the facts give us every reason
to believe that she preferred seeing her husband in
prison to being there herself. But by this standard
Hawkins' wife testified willingly, for she obviously
found an agreement to testify against her husband
more congenial than rotting in jail. In neither
instance would I call the testimony voluntary.
It is also likely that by the time of Trammel' s trial
his marriage was destroyed. Chief Justice Burger
certainly thought so, for as I've told you he wrote:
"When one spouse is willing to testify against the
other in a criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in
disrepair." Yet what follows from this if the disrepair
was caused, as we may assume for sake of argument,
solely because of the government's efforts. Surely a
court that acknowledges the privilege's importance to
marital harmony by continuing to vest it in the witness spouse should not tolerate a rule that gives the
government strong incentives to break up those marriages it can.
The government is quite open about what's going
on. Indeed, one of the state's primary arguments
for vesting the immunity in the witness spouse is the
"injustice to the witness-spouse of vesting in the
defendant the power to destroy the witness-spouse's
ability to reach a favorable arrangement with prosecutors in his or her own case." "[F]uture Elizabeth
Trammels," we are told, "would be prevented by
their husbands' power to invoke the marital privilege
from protecting their interests in avoiding severe
punishment." In other words it is unfair if the fact
that a couple are married means that the government
cannot destroy their relationship, the way it would
the relationship of ordinary co-conspirators, by
emphasizing conflicting interests and allowing one
guilty party to promote her well-being by turning in
the other. Put another way, it is unfair to the wife
if the state cannot threaten her with severe penalties
if she does not condemn her husband and reward
her with no penalty when she sells him out.
The Supreme Court in Trammel accepted this argument. I do not. First of all, I don't think the state
has any business turning one spouse against the
other, even if it might advantage the spouse who has
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turned. Second, consider the quality of the unfairness
that presumably results. A woman, unable to strike
a bargain because she cannot testify against her husband, is convicted of a crime she has committed.
What's wrong with that? Are we to pity all criminals
foolish enough to commit their crimes without
accomplices because there is no one they can betray
in exchange for a lighter sentence? Do criminals with
accomplices have, at least if they are the less culpable, an equal protection claim to an attractive plea
bargain contingent upon their turning state's
evidence?
To state these questions is, I think, to answer
them. If there is anything wrong with not allowing a
wife to waive the immunity, it is that a guilty husband will go free because a sufficient case cannot be
made against him. But this is the cost of the privilege
whether or not the wife was herself involved in the
crime and thus vulnerable to the pressures of "Let's
Make A Deal." We are back to basic value judgments
involving the sanctity of marriages, whatever interest
we have in their preservation, and the anguish of
the spouse who testifies.
The fact that a woman is coerced into agreeing to
testify does not mean that the decision to appear
"willingly" did not cause her considerable grief.
Indeed, it may lead to grief and guilt which will linger long after a prison sentence would have been
served. It is true that the guilty wife's anguish may
be assuaged by the thought that she will be spared
the trauma that goes with criminal punishment, but,
by the same token, an innocent wife's anguish might
be assuaged by the material joys she might purchase
if the state paid her a million dollars for her testimony. I believe we would not allow the state to buy,
with a sum of money, the testimony of a wife who
was involved in her husband's crime. If not, I don't
see a principled basis for letting the state buy that
testimony with a promise of leniency when the wife
is vulnerable to criminal prosecution.
I recognize the spousal immunity has serious costs,
but abrogating the privilege is costly also. I support
the privilege because I believe it is an important
symbolic statement of our attitude toward marriage,
because I believe it may play a role in keeping some
marriages together at an extremely stressful moment,
and because I believe it spares spouses, who may
be innocent of wrongdoing, the anguish of being
forced to testify against their loved ones. The Court's
decision in Trammel is completely consistent with
these values. I believe that decision is wrong because
it mistakenly assumes that testimony is voluntary
whenever a wife agrees to take the stand.
I fear that Trammel will do more than provide occasions on which the emptiness of moribund marriages
will be confirmed. Instead, it will give the government an incentive to tum spouses against each
other-to break up marriages in the cause of justice.
For me this is too high a price to pay. If justice, in
the marginal sense of convicting a few more guilty

men, means we must allow the state to coerce the
testimony of spouses, I am willing to trade a bit of
justice for a bit of humanity. Wigmore would, no
doubt, call these sentiments. I suppose they are. But I
hope you share them, and I believe they should continue to inform the law.
In conclusion I would like to tell you what this talk
is about, or at least what I have been about. My talk
is of course about the spousal immunity and the
Trammel case, but although I feel strongly about these
matters (perhaps more strongly than the issues warrant), I have not chosen this topic because I think
it important to persuade you of my position. I entertain no illusions on the issue that matters. No court,
having abrogated a privilege, has, to my knowledge,
subsequently reinstated it.
Instead of considering what I have said, consider
what I have been required to draw on: English legal

history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries;
Bentham and Wigmore, each a leading scholar of
his generation; logical analysis as we are taught it in
law schools; attorneys' briefs and Supreme Court
opinions; the sociology of prosecutorial behavior
(fraught, to be sure, with empirical inadequacy); and
your responses and mine to questions we cannot
escape when values clash. These are but some of the
paths down which the study of evidence takes you.
I hope that I have given you some sense of what
makes evidence a fascinating field of scholarship
(dare I say "the joys of evidence") and some understanding of why Mason Ladd, one of the great
figures in the history of Iowa Law School, chose to
devote his scholarly life to it.

Quotations from Paradise Lost by John Milton.
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